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ABSTRACT 
Most critics of Rousseau regard his account of the general 
will as incoherent. In this paper this assessment is challenged, I 
argue that the general will is simply the sum of the decisions made by 
individual citizens about what is in the public interest, and it is in 
the public interest to be governed by a regime that is capable of 
making Pareto improvements in the living conditions of those it 
governs, that is, a regime whose policies are such that at least one 
citizen is better off and no citizen is worse off, This reading is 
supported by an examination of the procedures Rousseau recommended for 
conducting assemblies at which the general will is to be expressed, 
Further, this reading has the advantage of being psychologically 
plausible -- at least for the small, homogeneous societies Rousseau 
was discussing. Finally, on this reading the problem of consent 
Rousseau's chief concern -- is solved, but again only for small 
homogeneous societies. 
ROUSSEAU'S GENERAL WILL, THE PARETO PRINCIPLE, 
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT* 
W, T, Jones 
There are almost as many views of Rousseau's general will as 
there are writers on Rousseau, Some theorists see Rousseau as facing 
an insoluble dilemma: what he says about the general will is either a 
truism or else false, 1 Others equate the general will with natural 
law.2 Others again regard the general will as an anticipation of
Hegelian doctrines. 3 More, perhaps, agree with the most recent 
student of the subject, who concludes that "Rousseau appears genuinely 
unable to make up his mind about what constitutes the general will and 
how it comes to be, 114 Yet, despite radical differences in 
interpretation, the nearly unanimous verdict -- one might almost say, 
the general will � of historians of political theory on the general 
will is unfavorable, 
I believe that a fresh reading of what Rousseau actually says 
in The Social Contract shows that the concept of the general will is 
empirical, not metaphysical or transcendental; clear and 
straightforward, not muddled or paradoxical; reasonably realistic, not 
sheerly utopian, It also proves a theoretical solution of the 
* I am much indebted to Bruce E. Cain, Ed Green and Charles 
Young for reading and commenting helpfully on an earlier draft 
of this paper. 
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political problem it was introduced to solve -- how men can be "at 
once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to115 -- though the 
solution is limited, as Rousseau himself recognized, to very small 
states. 
In this paper I will first set out what Rousseau says about 
the general will. My account will focus on the procedures Rousseau 
specified for conducting meetings of assemblies at which the general 
will is to be expressed. I focus on these rules -- largely neglected 
by critics of Rousseau -- because I believe they are the major clues 
to understanding what he conceived the general will to be, Next, I 
will put forward the suggestion that what Rousseau had in mind was 
something very much like the Pareto principle -- t.hat is, he believed 
that the citizens meeting in their assembly would know whether the 
regime which governed them had or had not effected a Pareto 
improvement since the last meeting of the assembly and that they would 
vote accordingly, approving it if it had effected a Pareto 
improvement, otherwise rejecting it. Since Rousseau did not formulate 
this view explicitly, my evidence for this suggestion must be 
indirect: if we assume that this was his view, what he actually says 
make much more sense than it otherwise would, and scattered passages 
which seem to be random obiter dicta fall into place as interconnected 
parts of a persuasive argument. Third, I shall explain why, if this 
is Rousseau's view ot the general will, it has been so frequently 
misunderstood, Finally, I will examine the concept of the general 
will critically, attempting to show that, so understood, it is viable, 
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I 
I have said that an important clue to understanding Rousseau's 
concept of the general will is the set of procedures he laid down for 
decision-making by the sovereign. To understand these procedures in 
their turn it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction he drew 
between sovereigns and governments or, alternatively, between laws 
(which are issued by some sovereign) and decrees (which are enacted by 
governments) . Many modern readers find Rousseau's view either 
confused or downright mistaken because they assume that he means by 
"law" what we today mean by "law. 11 They rightly hold it implausible 
to maintain that statutes like those setting income tax rates or 
appropriations for the school lunch program "express," or "reflect," 
the general will. But modern laws are Rousseau's decrees; in modern 
states there simply are no laws (in his sense of "law") °, for in modern 
states what Rousseau called the general will is never expressed, 
though pseudo-general wills may be expressed. 
•A sovereign proclaims laws; a government issues, or enacts, 
decrees. A sovereign is any assembly of people who have a common 
interest and who have a good idea what that common interest is, When 
an assembly is asked whether such-and-such a proposed change is in the 
public interest, its decision is final and is called a law. But 
assemblies meet infrequently and make few decisions. Hence there are 
few laws, in Rousseau's sense of "law." A government, on the other 
hand, is an administration which has been established by law. 
Governments are of many kinds -- monarchies, aristocracies, 
oligarchies, republics, democracies. Every type of government has its 
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own characteristic procedures for reaching agreement on the form and 
substance of the decrees it enacts and for enforcing them. It is 
necessary to mention this activity only to exclude it from 
consideration; it is not an expression of general will. The general 
will is not manifested in the decrees of governments but only in the 
decisions of sovereigns. 
It is theoretically possible that any society, however large, 
could have a common (public) interest. But the larger and more 
diversified a group is, the less likely that this will be the case. 
In contrast, members of small homogeneous groups are likely both to 
have a common interest and also to have little difficulty in agreeing 
about what their common interest is. This being the case that the 
common interest of a large group is not at all evident to its members, 
whereas the common interest of a small group is readily evident to its 
members -- it follows that a number of small, relatively homogeneous 
subgroups is likely to form within any large, heterogeneous group a 
subgroup of the wealthy as opposed to a subgroup of the poor, a 
subgroup of farmers as opposed to a subgroup of industrial workers, a 
subgroup of suburbanites as opposed to a subgroup of central-city 
dwellers and so on. Such subgroups form precisely because the 
members have recognized that they have a common interest; each such 
subgroup is constituted by, and limited to, people who believe 
whether rightly or wrongly is for the moment irrelevant -- that the 
existence of this subgroup will promote that common interest. The 
cohesion ot each such subgroup is sustained by its opposition to the 
other subgroups. "If there were no different interests, the common 
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interest would be barely felt, as it would encounter no obstacle; all 
would go on its own accord, and politics would cease to be an art.116 
In his studies of Poland and Corsica Rousseau was much 
concerned with the art of politics -- the art, that is, of balancing 
and equilibrating the divergent connnon interests of the various 
subgroups that together constitute a modern state, and with finding 
ways to lessen the divergencies (by means of a national educational 
system, for instance) .  But in The Social Contract Rousseau is less 
concerned with such problems � the problems of practical politics 
than with what he held to be the central moral problem of communal 
living -- the problem of consent. This is why, in that work, he 
concentrates on small relatively homogeneous groups, for he believed 
that men can be free and yet subject to laws they oppose only to the 
extent that they can easily ascertain what is to their common 
interest, 
In The Social Contract, then, the discussion focuses on how 
the connnon interest of the members of a group can be ascertained by. 
the group's own members. If the group is very small and very 
homogeneous, there is no problem. Everybody knows what the connnon 
interest is: "When bands of peasants are seen regulating affairs of 
State under an oak, and always acting wisely, , , , the connnon 
interest is everywhere clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed 
to perceive it,117 A band of peasants, however, is too simple an 
organization to need an administration, and though it may from time to 
time issue laws, it hardly needs to promulgate decrees in order to 
regulate the daily round, Nor is consent problematic. 
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But what of groups large enough to require an administration, 
even if only a rudimentary one? In such groups the common interest 
may not be "everywhere clearly apparent." Nevertheless, the general 
will -- the vote that expresses the common interest of the group as 
the group members understand that common interest -- will emerge if 
the following rules are followed: 
1. Assemble all members of the group together. (The group must be
small enough for this to be possible.)
2. Put all questions on which the assembly is to reach a decision in
a special form: never, "Are you in favor of so-and-so?" but
always, "Do you believe so-and-so is consistent with the common
interest?"
3. Put only general issues before the assembly, never specific ones, 
Never, for instance, ask whether so-and-so should be king (or 
president) .  Ask only whether the public interest is served by a 
monarchical (or republican) form of government, 
4. Do not allow the question to be discussed or debated, Members of 
the assembly should be "furnished with adequate information," but 
there should be "no communication one with another" prior to the
vote; "each citizen should think only his own thoughts.118 
5. Count the votes, seeing to it that every vote is counted,9 
Rousseau did not maintain that following these procedures will 
assure that the general will of the assembly is expressed, He was 
realistic enough to recognize that no procedures are infallible: it 
is always possible, he pointed out, that factions may emerge and 
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influence the result or, alternatively, th�t the administration may be 
able to manipulate the voting,l
O 
But he did hold that these 
procedures are more likely than any others to permit the general will 
of the assembly to emerge. Why? What was his reasoning? Answers to 
these questions will reveal what he understood the general will to be, 
Let us therefore take up the procedures one by one. 
l, Assemble all members: This is the easiest way -- in 
Rousseau's time perhaps the only way -- to assure that all members of 
the group vote and that all the votes are counted, and these are 
essential conditions for any expression of the general will of the 
whole group instead of the general will of some subgroup or other. 
2. Put the question in a special form: The form prescribed
for all questions posed to the assembly reduces the possibility of the 
personal interests of individual members affecting their vote. For 
voters are asked a factual question -- Is the proposal consistent with 
the public interest? -- a matter about which most of the members of a 
homogeneous group can be presumed to have reasonably reliable 
opinions. Unfortunately, there is nothing to prevent some of the 
members from answering a different question from the question they 
have been asked - "Instead of saying by his vote, 'It is to the 
advantage of the State,' [a member may in effect say] 'It is of 
advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should 
prevail. '1111 Rousseau's recognition of this possibility is one of the 
reasons why he did not think that assemblies of the people guarantee 
an expression of the general will. But that the question nevertheless 
be posed in the form prescribed is important for two reasons. First, 
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many, perhaps most, people will answer the question asked, rather than 
some other question. Second, the varied opinions of those who answer 
a different question will to some extent cancel each other out, 
whereas the answers of those who reply to the question asked will 
cluster around one point since everybody has a good idea of what the 
public interest is: 
There is often a great deal of difference between the 
will of all and the general will; the latter considers 
only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of 
particular wills: but take away from these same wills 
the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the 
general will remains as the sum of the differences, 12
3, Put only general issues: This rule, like Rule 2, is 
intended to reduce the chance that the vote of the assembly will 
reflect some combination of private interests rather than the public 
interest. And it is even more effective than Rule 2, for whereas Rule 
2 merely tends to direct attention away from private interests by the 
form in which the questions are posed, Rule 3 ,  by restricting 
questions to general issues, tends to eliminate the possibility of 
private interests having a seriously distorting effect, 
It is true that the veil envisaged by Rousseau is not opaque; 
it is only translucent. His citizens are not in an original position, 
But, after all, Rousseau was less concerned with a theory of justice 
than with the practical problem of arranging matters so that people 
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will not take too narrow, too immediate, a view of their own self-
interest. It is obvious that citizens cannot decide whether a 
proposal put before the assembly is, or is not, consistent with the 
public interest unless they understand what is involved -- that is why 
Rousseau wanted them to be "adequately informed." But since the issue 
posed is a general issue, they can be adequately informed about the 
overall advantages and disadvantages of, say, a monarchical 
(alternatively, republican) form of government without it being 
spelled out for them how their personal interests are affected. 
Doubtless some citizens may be able to calculate where their personal 
interests probably lay, and these may vote those interests, without 
regard to the common good. But many voters will be unable to make the 
calculation or, making it, will be too uncertain of the results to 
want to take it into account. In a word, this rule makes it difficult 
for many -- perhaps most -- voters to know how the proposal put before 
the assembly will affect their private interests. Hence, even if they 
want to vote their private interest, they will not know how to do so. 
4. Do not allow discussion or debate: Since all citizens are 
presumed to have a good idea of what the public interest is and since 
they have already been adequately informed regarding the issue posed, 
discussion and debate are counter-productive, So far from 
enlightening the citizens, it would distract their attention from the 
public good to their own (or to other people's) private good; it would 
invite the formation of factions which would, in effect, vote the 
different common interests of those factions, rather than the public 
\ 
good, i.e., the common good of all the citizens. 
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5. Count all the votes: If some citizens do not vote (or if 
some votes are not counted) , sampling errors will be introduced, The 
result might be a badly skewed distribution that did not represent the 
general will at all. To put this differently, since Rules 2 and 3 do 
not eliminate, but only reduce, the expression of private interests, 
the best way to obtain a distribution with a strong central tendency 
that represents the citizens' views of where the public interest lies 
is to count all votes, hoping that the expressions of deviant opinions 
"cancel one another. " 
II 
From this discussion of why Rousseau introduced these five 
rules for ascertaining the general will, what can be inferred about 
Rousseau's view ot what the public interest is? We know that the 
rules have been designed to produce an expression of the general will 
in contrast to the will of all. The general will does not differ from 
the will of all in being, somehow, a group will; it is no more a 
supra-individual will than is the will of all. Like the will of all 
the general will is the aggregated expression of a number of distinct, 
individual decisions. How, then, do they differ? When each of the 
individual decisions is determined by no other consid1eration than the 
voter's estimate of his own private interest, the result is an 
expression of the will of all, When each voter also takes into 
account the interests of his fellow citizens the result is an 
expression of the general will, 
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Each citizen who thinks that his own interests have suffered 
in the interval since the last assembly (who estimates himself to be 
worse off than he was then) , will naturally and rightly vote against 
the government -- so far, that is merely the will of all. If citizens 
who do not regard themselves as worse off also vote against the 
government because they believe some of their fellow citizens to be 
worse off, then it is the general will, not the will of all, that is 
being expressed. This is the case because the citizens are now taking 
into account not merely their own private interests, but also the 
interests of the other citizens as well, that is, the public interest. 
This is why I think there is a rather close similarity between 
Rousseau's general will and the Pareto principle. It is in the common 
interest to see to it that the result of any change is that at least 
some members -- ideally, of course, all members -- of the group will 
be better off than they were before that change occurred, providing no 
one is made worse off, Inasmuch as a change in which at least one 
person is better off and no one is worse off is a Pareto improvement, 
we may say that the common interest of any group is to maintain the 
status quo, whatever it happens to be unless, a proposed change is a 
Pareto improvement, The procedural rules are best understood as 
devices to make it difficult for people to focus too exclusively on 
their own private interests, thereby causing them to take into account 
as well the interests of the other citizens. 
We can now see why Rousseau insisted so strongly that the 
state be small and homogeneous. In the first place, in large and 
heterogeneous groups Pareto optimality is achieved at a very low level 
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of satisfaction, In such groups it will be very difficult for the 
government to put into effect any improvement for some that does not 
entail losses for others, In small homogeneous groups, in contrast, 
any improvement for some is likely to be an improvement for most, if 
not all, other members of that group. It is much easier, then, to 
design policies that are Pareto improvements for such groups. 
In the second place, members of small hompgeneous groups are 
likely to empathize with one another not merely to know (in the 
cognitive sense) 13 whether some of their fellow citizens have been
made worse off by the government's policies, but to sympathize with 
them -- to feel the losses of those other citizens almost as they 
would feel losses of their own. These empathizing sentiments are 
likely to develop naturally in the kind of community Rousseau 
envisages -- stable families living on the land, interacting 
constantly, intermarrying frequently, understanding each other's ways 
because they share them. But Rousseau was well aware that empathizing 
sentiments can also be deliberately cultivated and reenforced by 
education. The educational practices he proposed for his Emile and 
Sophie were by no means intended to stifle a child's self-love (to 
stifle it would be impossible) , but rather to strengthen his "love of 
those about him," a love which is as natural as his self-love and, as 
a matter of fact, "derived from it, 1 114 Emile and The Social Contract 
were published in the same year (17 6 2) ,  and we may take it that the 
educational program put forward in the former was intended to support 
the political program put forward in the latter: the educational 
program was intended to generate the kind of social context in which 
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the procedural rules would produce an expression of the general will. 
It is therefore important to bear the educational program of 
Emile in mind in connection with the distinction Rousseau draws in The 
Social Contract between what he calls an "aggregation" and what he 
calls an "association." An aggregation is any merely haphazard 
collection of "scattered" people who live under some rule (for 
instance, "a multitude enslaved by one man") , 15 If this one man were
by some improbable chance a beneficent ruler he would aim at 
maximizing the total amount of satisfaction in the aggregation as a 
whole, without regard to the individual components of that 
aggregation, Similarly, because the individual components of the 
aggregation are "scattered," each naturally thinks only of his own 
interest, In contrast, an association is a collection of people who 
share memories, sentiments and a way of life, Because they share 
memories, sentiments and a way of life, they have a common interest. 
That is to say, their private interests are mediated by the sentiments 
and memories they share, But each citizen's mediated interests remain 
incorrigibly private, his own. 
Though members of an association have a broader view of their 
private interests than the scattered components of an aggregation can 
have, no one who enters an association intends to "harm his own 
interests" or "neglect the care he owes to himself, " The common good 
of an association therefore is not simply the maximization of the 
total amount of satisfaction, without regard to how the satisfactions 
are distributed, It is not in the common interest of an association 
that anyone should lose, no matter how much the total quantity of 
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satisfaction might thereby be increased. On the contrary, the '�erson 
and the goods" of each member of the association are to be defended 
and protected "with the whole common force, 1116
In a word, it is obviously in the common interest of an 
association that all should gain. But if all cannot gain, it is in 
the common interest that at least some should gain, providing that no 
one loses, To say that the general will has been expressed in an 
assembly is simply to say that the citizens have voted for the common 
interest, thus defined, 
III 
If this is what Rousseau meant by the expression "general 
will," we have to ask why his view has so often been misunderstood. 
It must be allowed that Rousseau is partly responsible for the 
misunderstandings. Nowhere in The Social Contract is there a 
systematic exposition of the general will; rather, his view has to be 
collected from a number of what look almost like obiter dicta 
scattered through the work, In particular, the discussion of the 
rules, as we have called them, for ascertaining the general will have 
been inserted in the text haphazardly, often as footnotes to other 
arguments -- thus Rule 3 turns up as in connection with Rousseau's 
contention that the general will is indestructible,
17 It is as if he 
simply inserted a rule into the text at whatever point it happened to 
have occurred to him. The result is to obscure the reasoning that led 
him to formulate the rule in question and so makes it easy for the 
reader to miss altogether the light this reasoning actually throws on 
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the nature of the general will as Rousseau understood it, 
Further, Rousseau's general-law vocabulary has misleading 
connotations for post-Hegelian readers, Rousseau can hardly be blamed 
for failing to anticipate the arabesques that Hegel would play on this 
vocabulary, but the result is nonetheless unfortunate. When Rousseau 
declares that "The State is a moral person18 whose life is in the 
union of its members, 11 we are .likely to think of Hegel. But in the 
next paragraph Rousseau writes that "besides the public person we have 
to consider the private persons composing it.11 And here "composing" 
is the operative word: if it is true that "the Sovereign is sole 
judge" of the line "between the respective rights of the citizens and 
the Sovereign, 11 we must remember that Rousseau's Sovereign is only the 
citizens assembled together and voting in accordance with the 
prescribed rulea, 19
Thus, too, the assertion that "the general will is always 
right" has a metaphysical ring to it, especially if taken out of 
context. But the sentence actually goes on, "and tends to the public 
advantage.1120 In a word, so far from being a metaphysical claim, it 
is an empirical claim, viz. that what the assembled people, guided by 
the prescribed rules, say is the common good is in fact the common 
good, 
Again, to say that the members of the assembly "have a single 
will" also sounds suspect, but Rousseau's intention, as the context 
shows, is not to say that the will is single but that when the various 
members of some assembly are guided by the prescribed rules they 
always aim at the same object: "their common preservation and general 
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well-being.1121 That is, it is not the will, but the object willed,
that is "single." And la.tter in the same chapter, assertions to the 
effect that the general will is never "exterminated," never corrupted, 
but always "constant, unalterable, and pure," sound as if Rousseau's 
general will is a timeless, transcendental force in which the various 
empirical wills are somehow aufgehoben. But the context shows that 
Rousseau is only making the empirical assertion that for every 
assembly the�e is some state of affairs that is known by all assembly 
members to be in their common interest. Even when some member of the 
assembly lies about what he thinks is the public interest (e.g., even 
when he sells his vote), he knows perfectly well what the public 
interest is; it is simply the case that on this occasion it "seems to 
him negligible beside the exclusive good he aims at making his own. 11 
Thus, to say that the common interest is "unalterable" does not mean 
that it never changes, for in different circumstances the common 
interest of the assembly may well be different. Rather, it means that 
the common interest of this assembly in these particular circumstances 
is not affected -- not "corrupted" -- by the venality of this or that 
member of the assembly. 
IV 
So much, then, for the causes of misunderstanding. We have 
finally to ask whether, if this reading of Rousseau is correct, the 
general will is a viable concept. Thia breaks down into three 
subquestions, (1) Inasmuch as, on this view, Rousseau held that all 
the members of an assembly (i.e., of a small, homogeneous group) will 
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know whether or not the goverlUllent has effected a Pareto improvement 
since the last meeting of the assembly, we want to know whether this 
is likely to be the case. (2) Inasmuch as, on this view, Rousseau 
held not only that they will know whether it has effected a Pareto 
improvement, but also that, when questioned in the proper form, they 
will answer truthfully, we want to know whether this is 
psychologically plausible. (3) Inasmuch as Rousseau thought the 
concept of the general will so defined solves the problem of concept, 
we want to know whether it really does, 
(1) Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the kind of 
information it is required that the citizens have and act on. The 
citizens are not expected to be able to predict the likely effect of 
such-and-such proposed decrees (e,g,, a change in the income tax rate 
or a shift in budget priorities) , for decrees are never put before the 
citizens for their approval or disapproval, They are only expected to 
be able to make an overall estimate of the results achieved by the 
government in the interval since the last periodical assembly, During 
that interval the goverlUllent (whether it be monarchical, republican, 
or whatever) will have issued a number of decrees, each of which will 
have had effects, some favorable, some unfavorable, on the citizens, 
The effects, favorable and unfavorable, of these decrees will be 
differentially distributed among the citizens, and it is only required 
that each citizen be able to make a reliable estimate of the net 
effect -- on balance favorable or on balance unfavorable -- of these 
decrees on himself and on the other citizens, If the citizens can 
make this estimate they will have �ll the information they need to 
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vote intelligently on the questions put to them in the assemblies: 
First, "Does it please the Sovereign to preserve the present form of 
government?" Second, "Does it please the people to leave its 
administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of 
it? 1122 But will the citizens have the requisite information? And if
they have it, will they vote in accordance with it? 
If the members of a small, homogeneous group do not know 
whether or not the government they have been living under has effected 
a Pareto improvement, who would know? If anybody is better informed 
about the public interest of the group than the group itself, that can 
be only an outside expert or an inside expert. As for outside 
experts, is it not arguable that an assembly of the Hopi has a clearer 
view of Hopi interests than some bureaucrat or politician in 
Washington? That the opinions of slum dwellers (if collected in 
accordance with Rousseau's procedures) are more reliable than those of 
a social worker with an MA from Columbia or City College who commutes 
from the suburbs to spend an eight-hour day in an office in City Hall? 
That the members of a primitive tribe in some third-world state know 
better what their interests are than a development economist imported 
from abroad to advise the government? 
This brings us to the possibility of using inside experts·to 
declare what is to the group's common interest, and, as a matter of 
fact, outside experts commonly rely at least in part on the reports of 
inside experts � or, rather, on insiders whom the outsiders regard as 
experts. But what are the criteria by which the outsiders choose 
their "informants"? And is there any reason to have more confidence 
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in the opinion of an insider chosen in this way than in the verdict of 
an assembly of the insider's fellows? Alternatively, the informant 
may be chosen by his fellows, instead of by the outside expert 
himself, But to adopt this procedure is to interpose a redundant step 
between insiders and outsiders, If the people have been assembled to 
choose some insider to inform the outsider, the people may as well 
tell the outsider themselves what their view of their common interest 
is -- we are back to Rousseau's own proposal that the assembly declare 
its ve.rdict directly through its vote, rather than through a 
representative it has chosen, 
(2) Even allowing that the members of an assembly are better 
informed than any outsider can be regarding where the common interest 
of the assembly members lies, we have to ask whether it is plausible 
to hold that we will learn what it is by asking the members what it 
is, Are the members not more likely to vote, each of them, what he 
thinks is his own private interest rather than what he knows to be the 
common interest? 
Before we try to answer this question we need to spell out 
exaotly what Rousseau's scheme requires of the citizens in the way of 
sacrificing their private interests for the public good. First, 
citizens who believe that the government's policies have affected them 
adversely and who vote against it for that reason are not voting 
against the public interest, inasmuch as any change that affects 
anyone adversely is not a Pareto improvement. Secondly, citizens who 
believe that the government's policies have affected them favorably 
and who vote for it are not voting against the public interest, 
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providing they believe that those policies have not affected others 
adversely, inasmuch as a change that improves anyone's condition 
without damaging others in a Pareto improvement, What has to be 
guarded against is only the possibility that individuals who believe 
the government's policies have affected them favorably will vote for 
it even though they also believe that they have affected others 
adversely, Or rather, what we have to guard against is the 
possibility that a majority of citizens will vote in this way. 
Is it plausible to hold, with Rousseau, that a majority of 
citizens is unlikely to vote in this way -- that a majority is likely 
to vote for the public interest even when it conflicts with their own 
private interest? But that, from Rousseau's point of view, is a very 
confused way of posing the question, It is not a matter of expecting 
people ever to vote against their own private interests, and they 
never do so vote, inasmuch as their private interests are parts of the 
common good, Since the common interest is the sum of private 
interests, if we choose the common interest ''we cannot work for others 
without working for ourselves, • •  , There is not a man who does not 
think of 'each' as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for 
au. 11
23 Thus it is not a matter of selfishness vs. altruism, but of
what may be called intense selfishness vs. mediated selfishness, i.e., 
selfishness mediated and moderated by sympathy and fellow-feeling. It 
is not a matter of expecting people to be altruistic, if that means 
giving up a good one now possessed and handing it over to someone 
else, it is only a matter of expecting people to be willing to forego 
an additional good that one might acquire, if acquisition of that 
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additional good were to cause someone else who, of course, is no 
mere anonymous "anyone," but a neighbor -- to lose a good he now 
possesses. 
Rule 3 is intended to give moderate selfishness a relatively 
greater influence, as compared wit� intense selfishness, by distancing 
voters from the kinds of calculations that intense selfishness would 
want, and need, to make. Suppose a monarchical govermnent is in the 
public interest and that the voters know this to be the case, They 
are more likely to vote in favor of monarchy, and so in favor of the 
public interest, if the question is put "in the abstract," rather by 
naming "a particular person" as the proposed king.24 They are more 
likely, that is, to vote what they know to be the common good, if that 
is all they know, than if they also know who the king is to be and so 
can calculate whether he is likely to favor them personally or 
disfavor them. As for Rule 2, Rousseau, so far as I am aware, is one 
of the first thinkers to recognize -- what is now a sociological 
truism � the extent to which the form in which a question is asked 
intluences the answer given. 
Taken together, then, Rules 2 and 3 do indeed have a tendency 
to moderate intense selfishness, and Rule 4 tends to reduce the 
influence of faction. But will the combined effect of these rules be 
enough to produce the result Rousseau hoped for? That depends on what 
his hopes were, and his hopes seem to have been on the whole modest. 
He certainly never expected l!l1 members of any assembly to vote 
against changes that were not Pareto improvements. The most he hoped 
was that enough members would vote in this way for there to be a good 
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chance that the common good would stand revealed as the central 
tendency of the distribution of all votes, 
For my part, I confess to being less sanguine than Rousseau 
about how likely it is that the general will would be revealed as the 
central tendency of the distribution of votes. I think it would be 
difficult to distinguish between a central tendency that results from 
the manipulations of a cynical administration (or from the 
maneuverings of a combination of factions) and a central tendency that 
results from the fact that a majority of voters has voted for what 
they believe to be the common good. (I suspect that lurking somewhere 
in the background of Rousseau's thought is an outside expert 
himself I -- who knows how to distinguish the "good" central tendency 
from "bad 11 ones.) Nevertheless I do not know of anyone who has 
formulated better rules for discovering the general will, and I 
believe that Rousseau's rules might sometimes work, especially in the 
small, homogeneous groups for which they were intended. 
(3) Supposing that, at least on some occasions, the rules do 
work, is it then the case that on those occasions the members of the 
group are "at once free and [yet] subject to laws they have not agreed 
to"? That they are is of course Rousseau's central thesis -- his 
whole purpose in introducing the concept of the general will was a 
moral one. Unless men and women consent to be subjects, compulsion 
an essential element in all political organizations, even the smallest 
is immoral. But does the concept of the general will (as I have 
interpreted it) solve the problem of consent? My answer is that it 
does, but that the conditions within which the problem is solved are 
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so narrow -- so special -- that for practical purposes, in distinction 
from theoretical ones, the problem is left almost where it was before 
The Social Contract was written. 
It is possible to reconstruct Rousseau's thinking in the 
following way: the central tendency of the pattern of voting in an 
assembly discloses the general will of that assembly, i.e., the public 
interest, inasmuch as most members of the assembly have a good idea of 
what the public interest is and they have been asked a purely factual 
question, for instance, "Has the administration acted in the public 
interest since the last meeting of this assembly? "  Members whose 
votes deviate from this central tendency will be subject to a law 
which they opposed; they will not be free. For instance, if the 
public interest is found to be inconsistent with retaining the 
administration, those who voted for it will have a different 
administration imposed on them, But these deviant voters fall into 
two distinct categories: (i) the relatively small set of those who 
(mistakenly) believed that the present administration had acted in.the 
public interest, and (ii) the larger set of those who believed that 
the administration had not acted in the public interest but who 
nonetheless voted for it because they believed it to be in their own 
private interest, 
The problem of consent is solved for both subsets of deviants, 
but in different ways. (i) Like the majority -- just as much as the 
majority -- the members of the first subset voted for, and want, the 
public interest. They differ from the majority only in that they made 
a simple factual mistake about what the public interest is. Though 
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they voted to retain the administration and so are now subject to an 
administration they opposed, they voted for the public interest and so 
are also free, In Aristotelian terms,25 they and the majority agreed
on the major premise of the practical syllogism and differed only on 
the minor premise, They agreed with that majority -- to use one of 
Aristotle's examples -- that "Poison is bad"; they and the majority 
differed about whether "This is poison" is true of the liquid in this 
particular bottle. Now that the voting has shown that "This is 
poison" is true, not false as they mistakenly believed, they willingly 
turn away from the liquid they were about to drink; in abstaining from 
drinking the potion they are doing what they want, For these deviant 
members ot the assembly, then, the problem of consent is solved, 
(ii) Those who deliberately voted their private interest 
instead of what they knew to be the public interest are in an 
altogether different situation: they will now be living under an 
administration which they do not in any sense want for they did not 
accept the major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism that the 
majority and the first subset of deviants share. But the members of 
this second subset of deviants 
instead of the public interest 
by voting their private interests, 
have in effect taken themselves out 
of the community, They are -- at least for the present -- in the 
position of those who, at the original foundation of the state, voted 
against establishing it. If they remain in it, rather than 
emigrating, they are only "resident foreigners": they are subject to 
laws which are not subject to their own chosing, but by remaining 
instead of leaving, they give a possibly grudging and only ex post 
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consent, 
At the next meeting of the assembly these deviants will have 
an opportunity to rejoin the community by voting, this time, for the 
public interest, rather than for their varied private interests. This 
is still another reason why, in Rousseau's view, the regularly 
constituted "periodical assemblies" of the citizens are so 
important,26 By giving the citizens a regular opportunity to approve
or disapprove their provisional government (all governments without 
exception are of course "provisional") , we not only reduce the danger 
of usurpation; we also preserve the moral foundation of the state, for 
if the citizens do not reject the provisional government and replace 
it by another, they thereby consent to it, and so approve 
(provisionally) all the decrees to which, in the interval since the 
last assembly, it has subjected them,27 
Thus the problem of consent is solved -- but only for small, 
homogeneous groups and for them only on those occasion when one can be 
confident -- if, indeed, one can ever be really confident -- that the 
general will has emerged in the voting. This limitation -- which 
Rousseau certainly felt to be a limitation -- explains his insistence 
that states be small, It was more important, in his view, that states 
have a moral foundation than that they be viable, let alone powerful 
and successful, in the modern, eighteenth century world of large 
nation-states, 
But Rousseau was not wholly satisfied with what we have called 
a theoretical solution of the problem of consent; he wanted actual 
as it were, viable -- states to have a moral foundation. It was 
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essential, therefore, to find ways of generating a sense of -- a 
passion for -- the common good in groups so large and so diverse that 
the common good is not immediately evident to all the members of those 
groups, 
Hence his recommendations in the essays on Poland and Corsica 
for the systematic cultivation of "patriotic zeal. 11 What he proposed 
specifically for Poland would apply mutatis mutandis to any large 
nation-state: Develop distinctive national institutions that give 
form to the character, tastes, and customs of the Polish people; 
introduce distinctive Polish dress; revive or introduce public games 
distinctive to Poland; create a truly national educational system with 
only Poles for teachers and in which the children learn to read by 
reading Polish literature. The customs thus revived or newly 
introduced ''may be good or bad; that is not the point: even if bad 
they will endear Poland to its citizens" and so foster a sense of 
communality that will override the multitudinous private interests of 
28the diverse groups that make up modern Poland. 
That strong, even if only temporary, consensuses can be 
produced in large states is well-known -- one might say, painfully 
well-known. Italy under Mussolini in the heyday of his success, 
Germany under Hitler before things began to go sour in Russia, England 
in the desperate days of Dunkerque are examples, Though Rousseau had 
no idea, naturally, of the power of modern techniques of persuasion, 
he was by no means unaware of the other face of "patriotic zeal, 11 He 
recognized that by utilizing such means as those he recommended for 
Poland "the prince derives a great advantage in preserving his power 
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despite the people,1129
How to prevent his misuse of this power may be said to be a 
problem of practical politics, but there is a theoretical problem as 
well. Rousseau was aware that in very large and very heterogenous 
groups there is no immediately obvious common good, but it seems not 
to have occurred to him that in such groups there may be no common 
good at all, That is, in such groups there may be no way of improving 
the lot of some people without affecting others adversely. In such 
groups, as we have seen, Pareto optimality may be reached at a very 
low level of all-round satisfaction. If that is the case, if no 
common good already exists, patriotic zeal cannot generate one; at 
most it will produce only a fictive, or pseudo, common good. Unlike 
the veil of ignorance that Rule 3 is intended to cast over the private 
interests that might otherwise prevent citizens from concentrating on 
the public interest, patriotic zeal may be a veil that obscures the 
hard truth that no public interest exists. It would seem, then, that 
either some new definition of the public interest has to be formulated 
or that no modern state has a moral basis, That Rousseau put this 
dilemma so forcefully is a major contribution to political theory, 
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